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Abstract
We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assump-
tion that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distribu-
tional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our
mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions.
Prior-independent approximation mechanisms have been previously studied for the objective of revenue
maximization [13, 11, 26]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deter-
ministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3].
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of scheduling jobs on machines to minimize makespan in a strategic context. The
makespan the longest it takes any of the machines to complete the work assigned by the schedule. The
running time or size of a job on a machine is drawn from a fixed distribution, and is a private input known
to the machine but not to the optimizer. The machines are unrelated in the sense that the running time of
a job on distinct machines may be distinct. A scheduling mechanism solicits job running times from the
machines and determines a schedule as well as compensation for each of the machines. The machines are
strategic and try to maximize the compensation they receive minus the work they perform. We are interested
in understanding and quantifying the loss in performance due to the strategic incentives of the machines who
may misreport the job running times.
A primary concern in the theory of mechanism design is to understand the compatibility of various ob-
jectives of the designer with the incentives of the participants. As an example, maximizing social welfare is
incentive compatible; the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism obtains this socially optimal outcome
in equilibrium [27, 9, 15]. For most other objectives, however, the optimal solution ignoring incentives
(a.k.a. the first-best solution) cannot be implemented in an incentive compatible manner. This includes,
for example, the objectives of revenue maximization, welfare maximization with budgets, and makespan
minimization with unrelated machines. For these objectives there is no incentive compatible mechanism
that is best on every input. The classical economic approach to mechanism design thus considers inputs
drawn from a distribution (a.k.a. the prior) and looks for the mechanism that maximizes the objective in
expectation over the distribution (a.k.a. the second-best solution).
The second-best solution is generally complex and, by definition, tailored to specific knowledge that
the designer has on the distribution over the private information (i.e., the input) of the agents. The non-
pointwise optimality, complexity, and distributional dependence of the second-best solution motivates a
number of mechanism design and analysis questions.
price of anarchy: For any distribution over inputs, bound the gap between the first-best (optimal without
incentives) and second-best (optimal with incentives) solutions (each in expectation over the input).
computational tractability: For any distribution over inputs, give a computationally tractable implemen-
tation of the second-best solution, or if the problem is intractable give a computationally tractable
approximation mechanism.
simplicity: For any distribution over inputs, give a simple, practical mechanism that approximates the
second-best solution.
prior independence: Give a single mechanism that, for all distributions over inputs, approximates the
second-best solution.
These questions are inter-related. As the second-best mechanism is often complex, the price of anarchy
can be bounded via a lower bound on the second-best mechanism as given by a simple approximation
mechanism. Similarly, to show that a mechanism is a good approximation to second-best the upper bound
given by the first-best solution can be used. Importantly though, if the first-best solution does not permit
good approximation mechanisms then a better bound on the second-best solution should be sought. Each
of the questions above can be further refined by consideration with respect to a large class of priors (e.g.
identical distributions).
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The prior-independence question gives a middle ground between worst-case mechanism design and
Bayesian mechanism design. It attempts to achieve the best of both worlds in the tradeoff between infor-
mational efficiency and approximate optimality. Its minimal usage of information about the setting makes
it robust. A typical side-effect of this robustness is simple and natural mechanisms; indeed, our prior-
independent mechanisms will be simple, computationally tractable, and also enable a bound on the price of
anarchy.
The literature on prior-independent mechanism design has focused primarily on the objective of rev-
enue maximization. Hartline and Roughgarden [17] show that with sufficient competition, the welfare
maximizing (VCG) mechanism also attains good revenue. This result enables the prior-independent ap-
proximation mechanism for single-item auctions of Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden, and Yan [13] and the
multi-item approximation mechanisms of Devanur et al. [11] and Roughgarden et al. [26]. Importantly,
in single-item auctions the agents’ private information is single-dimensional whereas in multi-item auc-
tions it is multi-dimensional. There are several interesting and challenging directions in prior-independent
mechanism design: (1) non-linear objectives, (2) general multi-parameter preferences of agents, (3) non-
downwards-closed feasibility constraints, and (4) non-identically distributed types of agents. Our work
addresses the first three of these four challenges.
We study the problem of scheduling jobs on machines where the runtime of a job on a machine is that
machine’s private information. The prior over runtimes is a product distribution that is symmetric with
respect to the machines (but not necessarily symmetric with respect to the jobs). Ex ante, i.e., before the
job sizes are instantiated, the machines appear identical; ex post, i.e., after the job sizes are realized, the
machines are distinct and job runtimes are unrelated. The makespan objective is to schedule the jobs on
machines so as to minimize the time at which the last machine completes all of its assigned jobs. Our goal
is a prior-independent approximation of the second-best solution for the makespan objective.
To gain intuition for the makespan objective, consider why the simple and incentive compatible VCG
mechanism fails to produce a good solution in expectation. The VCG mechanism for scheduling minimizes
the total work done by all of the machines and accordingly places every job on its best machine. Note that
because the machines are a priori identical, this is an i.i.d. uniformly random machine for every job. There-
fore, in expectation, every machine gets an equal number of jobs. Furthermore, every job simultaneously
has its smallest size possible. However, the maximum load in terms of the number of jobs per machine and
so also the makespan can be quite large. The distribution of jobs across machines is akin to the distribution
of balls into bins in the standard balls-in-bins experiment—when the number of balls and bins is equal, the
maximum loaded bin contains Θ(log n/ log log n) balls with high probability even though the average load
is 1.
Our designed mechanism must prevent the above balls-in-bins style behavior. Consider a variant of
VCG that we call the bounded overload mechanism. The bounded overload mechanism minimizes the
total work with the additional feasibility constraint that the load (i.e., number of jobs scheduled) of any
machine is bounded to be at most a c factor more than the average load. This mechanism is “maximal in
range”, i.e., it is simply the VCG mechanism with a restricted space of feasible outcomes; it is therefore
incentive compatible. Moreover, the bounded overload mechanism can be viewed as belonging to a class of
“supply limiting” mechanisms (cf. the prior-independent supply-limiting approximation mechanism of [26]
for multi-item revenue maximization).
While the bounded overload mechanism evens out the number of jobs per machine, an individual job
may end up having a running time far larger than that on its best machine. The crux of our analysis is to
show that this does not hurt the expected makespan of our schedule relative to an ideal setting where every
job assumes its minimum size. Our analysis of job sizes has two components. First we show that every job
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with high probability gets assigned to one of its best machines. Second, we show that the running time of
a job on its ith best machine can be related within a factor depending on i to its running time on its best
machine. These components together imply that the bounded overload mechanism simultaneously obtains
a schedule that is balanced in terms of the number of jobs per machine and where every job has a small size
(in comparison to the best possible for that job). This is sufficient to imply a constant factor approximation
to expected makespan when the number of jobs is proportional to the number of machines.
The second component of our analysis of job sizes in the bounded overload mechanism entails relating
different order statistics of (arbitrary) i.i.d. distributions, a property that may have broader applications.
In particular, letting X[k:n] denote the kth minimum out of n independent draws from a distribution, we
show that for any k and n, X[k:n] is nearly stochastically dominated by an exponential function of k times
X[1:n/2]. In simple terms, the minimum out of a certain number of draws cannot be arbitrarily smaller than
the kth minimum out of twice as many draws.
As an intermediary step in our analysis we bound the performance of our approximation mechanism with
respect to the first-best solution with half the machines (recall, machines are a priori identical). Within the
literature on prior-independent revenue maximization this approach closely resembles the classical Bulow-
Klemperer theorem [4]. For auctioning k units of a single-item to n agents (with values drawn i.i.d. from a
“nice” distribution), the revenue from welfare maximization exceeds the optimal revenue from n−k agents.
In other words, a simple prior-independent mechanism with extra competition (namely, k extra agents) is
better than the prior-optimal mechanism for expected revenue. Our result is similar: when the number of
jobs is at most the number of machines and machines are a priori identical, we present a prior-independent
mechanism that is a constant approximation to makespan with respect to the first-best (and therefore also
with respect to the second-best) solution with half as many machines. Unlike the Bulow-Klemperer theorem
we place no assumptions the distribution of jobs on machines besides symmetry with respect to machines.
To design scheduling mechanisms for the case where the number of jobs is large relative to the number
of machines we can potentially take advantage of the law of large numbers. If there are many more large
jobs (i.e., jobs for which the best of the machines’ runtimes is significant) then assigning jobs to machines
to minimize total work will produce a schedule where the maximum work on any machine is concentrated
around its expectation; moreover, the expected load of any machine in the schedule that minimizes total
work is at most the expected load of any machine in the schedule that minimizes makespan.
On the other hand, if there are a moderate number, e.g., proportional to the number of machines, of jobs
with very large runtimes on all machines, both the minimum work mechanism and the bounded overload
mechanism can fail to have good expected makespan. For the bounded overload mechanism, although
the distribution of jobs across machines is more-or-less even, the distribution of the few “worst” jobs that
contribute the most to the makespan may be highly uneven. Indeed, for a distribution where the expected
number of large jobs is about the same as the number of machines, the bounded overload mechanism exhibits
the same bad balls-in-bins behavior as the minimum work mechanism.
The problem above is that the existence of many small, but relatively easy to schedule jobs, prevents the
bounded overload mechanism from working. To solve this problem we employ a two stage approach. The
first stage acts as a sieve and schedules the small jobs to minimize total work and while leaving the large
jobs unscheduled. Then in the second stage the bounded overload mechanism is run on the unscheduled
jobs. With the proper parameter tunings (i.e., job size threshold for the sieve and partitioning of machines to
the two stages) this mechanism gives a schedule with approximately optimal expected makespan. We give
two parameter tunings and analyses, one which gives an O(
√
logm) approximation and the other that gives
an O((log logm)2) approximation under a certain tail condition on the distribution of job sizes (satisfied,
for example, by all monotone hazard rate distributions).
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The proper tuning of the parameters of the mechanism require knowledge of a single order statistic of
the size distribution, namely the expected size of a job on its best out of k machines for an appropriate
value of k, to decide which jobs get scheduled in which stage. This statistic can be easily estimated as the
mechanism is running by using the reports of a small fraction of the machines as a “market analysis.” To
keep our exposition and analysis simple, we skip this detail and assume that the statistic is known.
Related work
There is a large body of work on prior-free mechanism design for the makespan objective. This work does
not assume a prior distribution, instead it looks at worst-case approximation of the first-best solution (i.e.,
the optimal makespan without incentive constraints). The problem was introduced by Nisan and Ronen [25]
who showed that the minimum work (a.k.a. VCG) mechanism gives an m-approximation to makespan
(where m is the number of machines). They gave a lower bound of two on the worst case approximation
factor of any dominant strategy mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling. They conjectured that the
best worst-case approximation is indeed Θ(m). Following this work, a series of papers presented better
lower bounds for deterministic as well as randomized mechanisms [8, 7, 18, 24]. Ashlagi, Dobzinski and
Lavi [3] recently proved a restricted version of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture by showing that no anonymous
deterministic dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism can achieve a factor better than m. This
lower bound suggests that the makespan objective is fundamentally incompatible with incentives in prior-
free settings. In this context, our work can be viewed as giving a meaningful approach for obtaining positive
results that are close to prior-free for a problem for which most results are very negative.
Given these strong negative results, several special cases of the problem have been studied. Lavi and
Swamy [19] give constant factor approximations when job sizes can take on only two different values. Lu
and Yu [22, 21, 20] consider the problem over two machines, and give approximation ratios strictly better
than 2.
Related machine scheduling is the special case where the runtime of a job on a machine is the product
of the machine’s private speed and the job’s public length. Importantly, the private information of each
machine in a related machine scheduling problem is single-dimensional, and the total length of the jobs as-
signed to any given machine in the makespan minimizing schedule is monotone in the machine’s speed. This
monotonicity implies that the related machine makespan objective is incentive compatible (i.e., the price of
anarchy is one). For this reason work on related machine scheduling has focused on computational tractabil-
ity. Archer and Tardos [2] give a constant approximation mechanism and Dhangwotnotai et al. [12] give
an incentive compatible polynomial time approximation scheme thereby matching the best approximation
result absent incentives. There are no known approximation-preserving black-box reductions from mecha-
nism design to algorithm design for related machine scheduling; moreover, in the Bayesian model Chawla,
Immorlica, and Lucier [6] recently showed that the makespan objective does not admit black-box reductions
of the form that Hartline and Lucier [16] showed exist for the objective of social welfare maximization.
Another line of work studies the makespan objective subject to an envy-freedom constraint instead of
the incentive-compatibility constraint. A schedule and payments (to the machines) are envy free if every
machine prefers its own assignment and payment to that of any other machine. Mu’alem [23] introduced
the envy-free scheduling problem for makespan. Cohen et al. [10] gave a polynomial time algorithm for
computing an envy-free schedule that is an O(logm) approximation to the first-best makespan (i.e., the
optimal makespan absent envy-freedom constraints). Fiat and Levavi [14] complement this by showing that
the optimal envy-free makespan (a.k.a. second-best makespan) can be an Ω(logm) factor larger than the
first-best makespan.
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2 Preliminaries and main results
We consider the scheduling of n jobs on m unrelated machines where the running time of a job on a machine
is drawn from a distribution. A schedule is an assignment of each job to exactly one machine. The load of
a machine is the number of jobs assigned to it. The load factor is the average number of jobs per machine
and is denoted η = n/m. The work of a machine is the sum of the runtimes of jobs assigned to it. The total
work is the sum of the works of each machine. The makespan is the most work assigned to any machine.
The vector of running times for each of the jobs on a given machine is that machine’s private informa-
tion. A scheduling mechanism may solicit this information from the machines, may make payments to the
machines, and must select a schedule of jobs on the machines. A scheduling mechanism is evaluated in the
equilibrium of strategic behavior of the machines. A particularly robust equilibrium concept is dominant
strategy equilibrium. A scheduling mechanism is incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for each
machine to report its true processing time for each job.
We consider the following simple mechanisms:
minimum work The minimum work mechanism solicits the running times, selects the schedule to mini-
mize the total work and pays each machine its externality, i.e., the difference between the minimum
total work when the machine does nothing and the total work of all other machines in the selected
schedule.
bounded overload The bounded overload mechanism is parameterized by an overload factor c > 1 and is
identical to the minimum work mechanism except it optimizes subject to placing at most cη jobs on
any machine.
sieve / anonymous reserve The sieve mechanism, also known as the anonymous reserve mechanism, is
parameterized by a reserve β ≥ 0 and is identical to the minimum work mechanism except that there
is a dummy machine added with runtime β for all jobs. Jobs assigned to the dummy machine are
considered unscheduled.
sieve and bounded overload The sieve and bounded overload mechanism is parameterized by overload c,
reserve β, and a partition parameter δ. It partitions the machines into two sets of sizes (1 − δ)m
and δm. It runs the sieve with reserve β on the first set of machines and runs the bounded overload
mechanism with overload c on the unscheduled jobs and the second set of machines.
The above mechanisms are incentive compatible. The minimum work mechanism is incentive compatible
as it is a special case of the well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism which is incentive com-
patible. The bounded overload mechanism is what is known as a “maximal in range” mechanism and is
also incentive compatible (by the VCG argument). The sieve / anonymous reserve mechanism is incentive
compatible because the incentives of the agents in the minimum work mechanism are unaffected by the
addition of a dummy agent. Finally, the sieve and bounded overload mechanism is incentive compatible
because from each machine’s perspective it is either participating in the sieve mechanism or the bounded
overload mechanism.
The runtimes of jobs on machines are drawn from a product distribution (a.k.a., the prior) that is sym-
metric with respect to the machines. (Therefore, the running times of a job on each machine are i.i.d. random
variables.) The distribution of job j on any machine is denoted Fj ; a draw from this distribution is denoted
Tj . The best runtime of a job is its minimum runtime over all machines, this first order statistic of m random
draws from Fj is denoted by Tj [1:m].
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Our goal is to exhibit a mechanism that is prior-independent and a good approximation to the expected
makespan of the best incentive compatible mechanism for the prior, i.e., the second-best solution. Because
both the second-best and the first-best expected makespans are difficult to analyze, we will give our approx-
imation via one of the following two lower bounds on the first-best solution.
expected worst best runtime The expected worst best runtime is the expected value of the best runtime of
the job with the longest best runtime, i.e., E[maxj Tj [1:m]]
expected average best runtime The expected average best runtime is the expected value of the sum of the
best runtimes of each job averaged over all machines, i.e., E[∑j Tj[1:m]]/m.
Intuitively, the former gives a good bound when the load factor is small, the latter when the load factor is
large. We will refer to any of these bounds on the first-best makespan as OPT, with the assumption that
which of the bounds is meant, if it is important, is clear from the context.
As an intermediary in our analysis of the makespan of our scheduling mechanisms with respect to OPT,
we will give bicriteria results that compare our mechanism’s makespan to the makespan of an optimal
schedule with fewer machines. This restriction is well defined because the machines are a prior identical.
For a given parameter δ, OPTδ will denote the optimal schedule with δm machines (via bounds as described
above). Much of our analysis will be with respect to OPT1/2, i.e., the optimal schedule with half the number
of machines.
While it is possible to construct distributions where OPT is much smaller than OPT1/2, for many
common distributions they are quite close. In fact, for the class of distributions that satisfy the monotone
hazard rate (MHR) condition,1 OPT and OPT1/2 are always within a factor of four; more generally OPT
and OPTδ are within a factor of 1/δ2 for these distributions. (See proof in Section 5.)
Lemma 2.1 When the distributions of job sizes have monotone hazard rates the expected worst best and
average best runtimes on δm machines are no more than 1/δ2 times the expected worst best and average
best runtimes, respectively, on m machines.
2.1 Main Results
Our main theorems are as follows. When the number of jobs is comparable to the number of machines, i.e.,
the load factor η is constant, then the bounded overload mechanism is a good approximation to the optimal
makespan on m/2 machines.
Theorem 2.2 For n jobs, m machines, load factor η = n/m, and runtimes distributed according to a
machine-symmetric product distribution, the expected makespan of the bounded overload mechanism with
overload c = 7 is a 200η approximation to the expected worst best runtime, and hence also to the optimal
makespan, on m/2 machines.
Corollary 2.3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 where additionally the distributions of job sizes have
monotone hazard rates, the expected makespan of the bounded overload mechanism with c = 7 is a 800η
approximation to the expected optimal makespan.
1The hazard rate of a distribution F is given by h(x) = f(x)
1−F (x)
, where f is the probability density function for F ; a distribution
F satisfies the MHR condition if h(x) is non-decreasing in x. Many natural distributions such as the uniform, Gaussian, and
exponential distributions, satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition. Intuitively, these are distributions with tails no heavier than
the exponential distribution.
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When the load factor η is large and the job runtimes are identically distributed, the sieve and bounded
overload mechanism is a good approximation to the optimal makespan. The following theorems and corol-
laries demonstrate the sieve and bounded overload mechanism under two relevant parameter settings.
Theorem 2.4 For n jobs, m machines, and runtimes from an i.i.d. distribution, the expected makespan
of the sieve and bounded overload mechanism with overload c = 7, partition parameter δ = 2/3, and
reserve β = nm logm E[T [1:
δ
2m]] is an O(
√
logm) approximation to the larger of the expected worst best
and average best runtime, and hence also to the optimal makespan, on m/3 machines. Here T denotes a
draw from the distribution on job sizes.
Corollary 2.5 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.4 where additionally the distribution of job sizes has
monotone hazard rate, the expected makespan of the sieve and bounded overload mechanism is anO(√logm)
approximation to the expected optimal makespan.
Theorem 2.6 For n ≥ m logm jobs, m machines, and runtimes from an i.i.d. distribution, the expected
makespan of the sieve and bounded overload mechanism with overload c = 7, partition parameter δ =
1/ log logm, and reserve
β = 2nm logm E[T [1:
δ
2m]], is a constant approximation to the larger of the expected worst best and average
best runtime, and hence also to the optimal makespan, on δm/2 machines. Here T denotes a draw from the
distribution on job sizes.
Corollary 2.7 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 where additionally the distribution of job sizes has
monotone hazard rate the expected makespan of the sieve and bounded overload mechanism is aO((log logm)2)
approximation to the expected optimal makespan.
We prove Theorem 2.2 in Section 3 and Theorems 2.4 and 2.6 in Section 4.
2.2 Probabilistic Analysis
Our goal is to show that the simple processes described by the bounded overload and sieve mechanisms
result in good makespan and our upper bound on makespan is given by the first order statistics of each job’s
runtime across the machines. The sieve’s performance analysis is additionally governed by the law of large
numbers. We describe here basic facts about order statistics and concentration bounds. Additionally we give
a number of new bounds, proofs of which are in Section 5.
For random variable X and integer k, we consider the following basic constructions of k independent
draws of the random variable. The ith order statistic, or the ith minimum of k draws, is denoted X[i:k].
The first order statistic, i.e., the minimum of the k draws, is denoted X[1:k]. The kth order statistic, i.e., the
maximum of k draws, is denoted X[k:k]. Finally, the sum of k draws is denoted X[Σk]. We include the
possibility that i or k can be random variables. We also allow the notation to cascade, e.g., for the special
case where the jobs are i.i.d. from F the lower bounds on OPT are T [1:m][n:n] and T [1:m][Σn]/m for the
expected worst best and average best runtime, respectively, and T drawn from F .
We will use the following forms of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds in this paper. Let X =
∑
iXi, where
Xi ∈ [0, B] are independent random variables. Then, for all ǫ ≥ 1,
Pr[X > (1 + ǫ)E[X]] < exp
(
−ǫE[X]
3B
)
< exp
(
−(1+ǫ)E[X]
6B
)
Our analysis often involves relating different order statistics of a random variable (e.g. how does the
size of a job on its best machine compare to that on its second best machine). We relate these different order
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statistics via the stochastic dominance relation. This is useful in our analysis because stochastic dominance
is preserved by the max and sum operators. We say that a random variable X is stochastically dominated
by another random variable Y if for all t, Pr[X ≤ t] ≥ Pr[Y ≤ t]. Stochastic dominance is equivalent to
being able to couple the two random variables X and Y so that X is always smaller than Y .
Below, the first lemma relates the ith order statistic over some number of draws to the first order statistic
over half the draws. The second relates the minimum over several draws of a random variable to a single
draw of that variable. The third relates the maximum over multiple draws of a random variable to an
appropriate sum over those draws. These lemmas are proved in Section 5.
Lemma 2.8 Let X be any nonnegative random variable and m and i ≤ m be arbitrary integers. Let α
be defined such that Pr[X ≤ α] = 1/m (or for discontinuous distributions, α = sup{z : Pr[X ≤ z] <
1/m}). Then X[i:m] is stochastically dominated by max(α,X[1:m/2][4i:4i]).
Lemma 2.9 For a random variable X whose distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, X
is stochastically dominated by rX[1:r].
Lemma 2.10 Let K1, · · · ,Kn be independent and identically distributed integer random variables such
that for some constant c > 1, we have Kj ≥ c, and let W1, · · · ,Wn be arbitrary independent nonnegative
variables. Then,
E [maxj Wj[Kj :Kj]] ≤ cc−1 E [K1]E [maxj Wj] .
We will analyze the expected makespan of a mechanism as the maximum over a number of correlated
real-valued random variables. The correlation among these variables makes it difficult to understand and
bound the makespan. Our approach will be to replace these random variables with an ensemble of indepen-
dent random variables that have the same marginal distributions. Fortunately, this operation does not change
the expected maximum by too much. Our next lemma relates the expected maximum over an arbitrary set
of random variables to the expected maximum over a set of independent variables with the same marginal
distributions. It is a simple extension of the correlation gap results of Aggarwal et al. [1], Yan[28], and
Chawla et al. [5].
Lemma 2.11 Let X1, · · · ,Xn be arbitrary correlated real-valued random variables. Let Y1, · · · , Yn be
independent random variables defined so that the distribution of Yi is identical to that of Xi for all i. Then,
E[maxj Xj ] ≤ ee−1 E[maxj Yj].
3 The bounded overload mechanism
Recall that the bounded overload mechanism minimizes the total work subject to the additional feasibil-
ity constraint that every machine is assigned at most cη jobs. In this section we prove that the expected
makespan of the bounded overload mechanism, with the overload set to c = 7, is a 200η factor approxima-
tion to the expected best worst runtime and thus to the optimal makespan.
Intuitively the bounded overload mechanism tries to achieve two objectives simultaneously: (1) keep
the size of every job on the machine its schedule to be close to its size on its best machine, but also (2)
evenly distribute the jobs across all the machines. Recall, that the minimum work mechanism achieves
the first objective exactly, but fails on the second objective. Due to the independence between jobs, the
number of jobs on each machine may be quite unevenly distributed. In contrast, the bounded overload
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mechanism explicitly disallows uneven assignments of jobs and therefore the main issue to address in its
analysis is whether it satisfies the first objective, i.e., that the sizes of the jobs are close to what they are in
the minimum work mechanism.
To setup for the proof of Theorem 2.2 consider the following definitions that describe the outcome of
the bounded overload mechanism and the worst best runtime on m/2 machines (which bounds the optimal
makespan on m/2 machines). Let Tj denote a random variable drawn according to job j’s distribution of
runtimes Fj . Let Bj denote the job’s best runtime out of m/2 machines, i.e., Bj = Tj [1:m/2], the first order
statistic of m/2 draws. The expected worst best runtime on m/2 machines is E[maxj Bj ]. The bounded
overload mechanism considers placing each job on one of m machines. These runtimes of job j drawn i.i.d.
from Fj impose a (uniformly random) ordering over the machines starting from the machine that is “best”
for j to the one that is “worst”; this is j’s preference list. Let Tj [r:m] denote the size of job j on the rth
machine in this ordering (also called the job’s rth favorite machine). Let Rj be a random variable to denote
the rank of the machine that job j is placed on by the bounded overload mechanism. As each machine is
constrained to receive at most cη jobs, the expected makespan of bounded overload is cηE[maxj Tj [Rj :m]].
We will bound this quantity in terms of E[maxj Bj ].
There are three main parts to our argument. First, we note that the Rjs are correlated across different
j’s, and so are the Tj[Rj :m]s. This makes it challenging to directly analyze E[maxj Tj [Rj:m]]. We use
Lemma 2.11 to replace the Rjs in this expression by independent random variables with the same marginal
distributions. We then show that the marginal distributions can be bounded by simple geometric random
variables R˜j . To do so, we introduce another procedure for assigning jobs to machines that we call the last
entry procedure. The assignment of each job under the last entry procedure is no better than its assignment
under bounded overload. On the other hand, the ranks of the machines to which jobs are allocated in the last
entry procedure are geometric random variables with a bounded failure rate. Finally, we relate the runtimes
Tj [R˜j:m] to the optimal runtimes Bj using Lemma 2.8.
We begin by describing the last entry procedure.
last entry In order to schedule job j, we first apply the bounded overload mechanism BOc to all jobs other
than j. We then place j on the first machine in its preference list that has fewer than cη jobs. Let Lj
denote the rank of the machine to which j gets allocated.
We now make a few observations about the ranks Lj realized by the last entry procedure.
Lemma 3.1 The runtime of any job j in bounded overload is no worse than its runtime in the last entry
procedure. That is, Rj ≤ Lj .
Proof: Fix any instantiation of jobs’ runtimes over machines. Consider the assignment of job j in the last
entry procedure, and let LE(j) denote the schedule where all of the jobs but j are scheduled according
to bounded overload and j is scheduled according to the last entry procedure. Since the bounded overload
mechanism minimizes total work, the total runtime of all of the jobs in BOc is no more than the total runtime
of all of the jobs in LE(j). On the other hand, the total runtime of all jobs except j in LE(j) is no more than
the total runtime of all jobs except j in BOc. This immediately implies that j’s runtime in bounded overload
is no more than its runtime in last entry. Since this holds for any fixed instantiation of runtimes, we have
Rj ≤ Lj .
Next, we show that the rank Lj of a job j in last entry is stochastically dominated by a geometric random
variable R˜j that is capped at ⌈mc ⌉. Note that Lj is at most ⌈mc ⌉ since ⌈mc ⌉ machines can accommodate
⌈mc ⌉cη ≥ n jobs and therefore last entry will never have to send a job to anything worse than its ⌈mc ⌉th
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favorite machine. The random variable R˜j also lives in {1, . . . , ⌈mc ⌉}, and is drawn independently for all j
as follows: for i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈mc ⌉ − 1}, we have Pr[R˜j = i] = 1−1/cci−1 ; and the remaining probability mass is
on ⌈mc ⌉.
Lemma 3.2 The rank Lj of a job j in last entry is stochastically dominated by R˜j , and so the runtime of
job j in last entry is stochastically dominated by Tj [R˜j :m].
Proof: We use the principle of deferred decisions. In order to schedule j, the last entry procedure first runs
bounded overload on all of the jobs other than j. This produces a schedule in which at most a 1c fraction
of the machines have all of their slots occupied. Conditioned on this schedule, job j’s preference list over
machines is a uniformly random permutation. So the probability (over the draw of j’s runtimes) that job j’s
favorite machine is fully occupied is at most 1/c. Likewise, the probability that the job’s two most favorite
machines are both occupied is at most 1/c2, and so on. Therefore, the rank of the machine on which j is
eventually scheduled is dominated by a geometric random variable with failure rate 1/c. Lemmas 3.1
and 3.2 yield the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 For all j, the runtime Tj[Rj :m] of job j in bounded overload is stochastically dominated by
Tj [R˜j:m].
The benefit of relating Tj [Rj :m]s with Tj[R˜j :m]s is that while the former are correlated random vari-
ables, the latter are independent, because the R˜j’s are picked independently. Corollary 3.3 implies that we
can replace the former with the latter, gaining independence, while losing only a constant factor in expected
makespan.
Corollary 3.4 E[maxj Tj[Rj :m]] is no more than e/(e − 1) times E[maxj Tj[R˜j :m]].
The final part of our analysis relates the Tj [R˜j :m]s to the Bjs. A natural inequality to aim for is to bound
E[Tj [R˜j:m]] from above by a constant times E[Bj ] for each j. Unfortunately, this is not enough for our pur-
poses: note that our goal is to upper bound E[maxj Tj [R˜j :m]] in terms of E[maxj Bj]. Thus we proceed to
show that Tj[R˜j :m] is stochastically dominated by a maximum among some number of copies of Bj . We ap-
ply Lemma 2.8 (stated in Section 2 and proved in Section 5) to the random variable Tj[i:m] for this purpose.
Define αj = sup{t : Fj(t) < 1/m}. Then the lemma shows that Tj[i:m] is stochastically dominated by
max(αj , Bj [4
i:4i]).
Let Dj be defined as 4R˜j . Note that E[Dj ] can be bounded by a constant whenever c > 4 (this upper
bound is obtained by treating R˜j as a geometric random variable without being capped at ⌈mc ⌉). Then
Lemma 2.8 implies the following corollary.
Lemma 3.5 Tj[R˜j :m] is stochastically dominated by max(αj , Bj [Dj :Dj ]).
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2.2 For n jobs, m machines, load factor η = n/m, and runtimes distributed according to a
machine-symmetric product distribution, the expected makespan of the bounded overload mechanism with
overload c = 7 is a 200η approximation to the expected worst best runtime, and hence also to the optimal
makespan, on m/2 machines.
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Proof: The proof follows from the following series of inequalities that we explain below. First we have
Makespan(BOc) ≤ cηE [maxj Tj [Rj :m]] by the fact that BOc schedules at most cη jobs per machine
e− 1
e
E
[
max
j
Tj[Rj :m]
]
≤ E
[
max
j
Tj [R˜j:m]
]
≤ E
[
max
j
(max(αj , Bj [Dj :Dj]))
]
≤ E
[
max
j
(αj +Bj [Dj :Dj ])
]
≤ max
j
αj +E
[
max
j
Bj [Dj :Dj ]
]
≤ 2OPT1/2 + 44−2 E[Dj ]E[maxj Bj]
≤
(
2 + 8
c− 1
c− 4
)
OPT1/2.
The first of the inequalities follows from Lemma 3.4, the second from Lemma 3.5, the third from noting that
the maximum of non-negative random variables is upper bounded by their sum, and the last by the definition
of OPT1/2, along with the fact that E[Dj ] ≤ 4 c−1c−4 . For the fifth inequality we use Lemma 2.10 to bound
the second term. For the first term in that inequality consider the job j that has the largest αj . For this
job, the probability that its size on all of the m/2 machines in OPT1/2 is at least αj is (1− Fj(αj))m/2 ≥
(1− 1/m)m/2 ≥ 1/2 by the definition of αj . So OPT1/2 ≥ maxj αj/2.
The final approximation factor therefore is cη ee−1
(
2 + 8 c−1c−4
)
for all c > 4. At c = 7, this evaluates to
a factor 200η approximation.
4 The sieve and bounded overload mechanism
We will now analyze the performance of the sieve and bounded overload mechanisms under the assumption
that the jobs are a priori identical. Let us consider the sieve mechanism first. Recall that this is essentially
the minimum work mechanism where every job is assigned to its best machine, except that jobs with a size
larger than β on every machine are left unscheduled. The bound of β on the size of scheduled jobs allows
us to employ concentration results to bound the expected makespan of the mechanism. Changing the value
of β allows us to tradeoff the makespan of the mechanism with the number of unscheduled jobs.
Lemma 4.1 For k < logm, the expected makespan of the sieve mechanism with β = nE[T [1:m]]km is no more
than O(logm/k) times the expected average best runtime, and hence also the expected optimal makespan.
The expected number of jobs left unscheduled by the mechanism is km.
Proof: Let us first consider the expected total work of any single machine, that is the expected total size
of jobs scheduled on that machine. Let Yij be a random variable that takes on the value 0 if job j is not
scheduled on machine i, and takes on the size of j on machine i if the job is scheduled on that machine.
The probability that j is scheduled on i is no more than 1/m; its expected size on i conditioned on being
scheduled is at most τ = E[T [1:m]]. Therefore, E[∑j Yij] ≤ nτm , which in turn is at most the average best
runtime.
12
Note that the Yij’s are independent and bounded random variables. So we can apply Chernoff-Hoeffding
bounds and use β = nτkm to get
Pr
[∑
j
Yij >
7 logm
k OPT
]
≤ Pr
[∑
j
Yij >
7 logm
k E
[∑
j
Yij
]]
< exp
(
−13 6 logmk nτβm
)
= 1m2 .
Taking the union bound over the m machines, we get that with probability 1 − 1/m, the makespan of the
sieve mechanism is at most O(logm/k) times OPT.
We will now convert this tail probability into a bound on the expected makespan. Let γ denote the factor
by which the expected makespan of the mechanism exceeds OPT. Remove all jobs with best runtimes
greater than β from consideration and consider creating sieve’s schedule by assigning each of the leftover
jobs to their best machine (minimizing total work) one-by-one in decreasing order of best runtime, until the
makespan exceeds 7k logm times OPT. This event happens with a probability at most 1/m. When this event
happens, we are left with a smaller set of jobs; conditioned on being left over at this point, these jobs have a
smaller best runtime than the average over all scheduled jobs. Thus the expected makespan for scheduling
them will be at most γOPT. So we get γ ≤ 7 logm/k + γ/m, i.e., γ = O(logm/k). This implies the first
part of the lemma.
We now prove the second part of the lemma, i.e., the expected number of jobs left unscheduled is
km. Note that β exceeds a job’s expected best runtime by a factor of n/km. Thus by applying Markov’s
inequality, we get the probability of a job’s best runtime being larger than β to be at most km/n. Hence the
expected number of jobs with best runtime larger than β is km.
Next we will combine the sieve mechanism with the bounded overload mechanism. We consider two
different choices of parameters. Note that if in expectation the sieve mechanism leaves km jobs unscheduled,
using the bounded overload mechanism to schedule these jobs over a set of Ω(m) machines gives us an
expected makespan that is at most O(k) larger than the expected optimal makespan on that number of
machines. In order to balance this with the makespan achieved by sieve, we pick k =
√
logm. This gives
us Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 2.4 For n jobs, m machines, and runtimes from an i.i.d. distribution, the expected makespan of
the sieve and bounded overload mechanism with overload c = 7, partition parameter δ = 2/3, and reserve
β = nm logm E[T [1:
δ
2m]], is an O(
√
logm) approximation to the larger of the worst best runtime and the
average best runtime, and hence also to the optimal makespan, on m/3 machines. Here T denotes a draw
from the distribution on job sizes.
Proof: For the choice of parameters in the theorem statement, we use m/3 of the m machines for the
sieve mechanism, and the remainder for the bounded overload mechanism. The expected makespan of the
overall mechanism is no more than the sum of the expected makespans of the two constituent mechanisms.
Lemma 4.1 implies that the expected makespan of the sieve mechanism is
O(
√
logm) times OPT1/3, and the load factor for the bounded overload mechanism is also O(
√
logm).
Theorem 2.2 then implies that the expected makespan of the bounded overload mechanism is alsoO(
√
logm)
times OPT1/3.
If we partition the machines across the sieve and the bounded overload mechanisms roughly equally,
then Theorem 2.4 gives us the optimal choice for the parameter β. A different possibility is to perform a
more aggressive screening of jobs by using a smaller β, while comparing our performance against a more
heavily penalized optimal mechanism – one that is allowed to use only a δ fraction of the machines.
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Theorem 2.6 For n ≥ m logm jobs, m machines, and runtimes from an i.i.d. distribution, the expected
makespan of the sieve and bounded overload mechanism with overload c = 7, partition parameter δ =
1/ log logm, and reserve β = 2nm logm E[T [1:
δ
2m]], is a constant approximation to the larger of the worst
best runtime and the average best runtime, and hence also to the optimal makespan, on δm/2 machines.
Here T denotes a draw from the distribution on job sizes.
Proof: We will show that the expected makespan of the sieve mechanism is at most a constant times the
average best runtime on δm/2 machines, and the expected number of unscheduled jobs is O(δm). The
current theorem then follows by applying Theorem 2.2.
Let us analyze the expected makespan of the sieve mechanism first. Let τ = E[T [1: δ2m]]. Then we can
bound OPTδ/2 as OPTδ/2 ≥ 2nτδm . As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, let Yij be a random variable that takes
on the value 0 if job j is not scheduled on machine i, and takes on the size of j on machine i if the job is
scheduled on that machine. Then,
E
[∑
j
Yij
]
≤ n(1−δ)m E[T [1:(1− δ)m]] ≤ nτ(1−δ)m ≤ δ2(1−δ)OPTδ/2.
Applying Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds we get
Pr
[∑
j
Yij > 2OPTδ/2
]
≤ Pr
[∑
j
Yij > 4(1/δ − 1)E
[∑
j
Yij
]]
< exp
(
−1δ nτ(1−δ)m 1β
)
≤ m−1/2δ.
Here we used β = 2nτ/m logm. Taking the union bound over the m machines, we get that with probability
o(1), the makespan of the sieve mechanism is at most twice OPTδ/2. Once again, as in the proof of
Lemma 4.1 we can convert this tail bound into a constant factor bound on the expected makespan.
Now let us consider the jobs left unscheduled. For any given job, we will compute the probability that
its runtime on all of the (1− δ)m machines is larger than β. Because β is defined in terms of T [1: δ2m], we
will consider the machines in batches of size δm/2 at a time. Using Markov’s inequality, the probability that
the job’s runtime exceeds β on all machines in a single batch is at most m logm/2n. There are 2(1/δ − 1)
batches in all, so the probability that a job remains unscheduled is at most (m logm/n)(22(1−1/δ)), which
by our choice of δ is O(δm/n).
5 Deferred proofs
In this section we prove the bounds for random variables and order statistics from Section 2.2.
Lemma 2.8 Let X be any nonnegative random variable, and m, i ≤ m be arbitrary integers. Let α be
defined such that Pr[X ≤ α] = 1/m (or for discontinuous distributions, α = sup{z : Pr[X ≤ z] <
1/m}). Then X[i:m] is stochastically dominated by max(α,X[1:m/2][4i:4i]).
Proof: Let F be the cumulative distribution function ofX. We prove this by showing that X[i:m] is “almost”
stochastically dominated by X[1:m/2][4i:4i]; specifically, we show that for all t ≥ α,
Pr [X[i:m] > t] ≤ Pr [X[1:m/2][4i:4i] > t] .
To prove this inequality, we will define a process for instantiating the variables X[i:m] and X[1:m/2][4i:4i]
in a correlated fashion such that the former is always larger than the other.
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X[1:m/2][4i:4i] is a statistic based on 4im/2 independent draws of the random variable X. Consider
partitioning these draws into 4i/2 groups of sizem each. We then randomly split each group into two smaller
groups, which we will refer to as blocks, of size m/2 each. Define a good event G to be the event that at
least one of these 4i/2 groups get split such that the i smallest runtimes in it all fall into the same block. If
event G occurs, arbitrarily choose one group which caused event G, and for all k define X[k:m] to be the
kth min from this group. Otherwise, select an arbitrary group to define the X[k:m]. Note that since we split
the groups into blocks randomly, and this is independent of the drawn runtimes in the groups, X[k:m] has
the correct distribution, both when G occurs and does not occur. Define the minimum from each of the 4i
blocks to be a draw of X[1:m/2]. Thus, whenever G occurs, the probability that the X[1:m/2][4i:4i] > t is
at least the probability that X[i + 1:m] > t. We have that
Pr
[
X[1:m/2][4i:4i] > t
] ≥ Pr [G] ·Pr [X[i+ 1:m] > t]
=
(
Pr [G] · Pr [X[i+ 1:m] > t]
Pr [X[i:m] > t]
)
·Pr [X[i:m] > t] .
We now show that
(
Pr [G] · Pr[X[i+1:m]>t]
Pr[X[i:m]>t]
)
≥ 1 whenever F (t) ≥ 1/m, which completes our proof of the
lemma. Note that
Pr [X[i+ 1:m] > t]
Pr [X[i:m] > t]
=
∑i
k=0
(
m
k
)
F (t)k(1− F (t))m−k∑i−1
k=0
(
m
k
)
F (t)k(1− F (t))m−k
= 1 +
(m
i
)
F (t)i(1− F (t))m−i∑i−1
k=0
(m
k
)
F (t)k(1− F (t))m−k ,
which we can see is an increasing function of F (t). Thus in the range F (t) ≥ 1/m, it attains its minimum
precisely at F (t) = 1/m. Substituting F (t) = 1/m into the above, and using standard approximations for(m
k
) (namely (mk )k ≤ (mk ) ≤ (mek )k, we have
Pr [X[i+ 1:m] > t]
Pr [X[i:m] > t]
≥ 1 +
(
m
i
)i ( 1
m
)i (
1− 1m
)m−i
(
1− 1m
)m
+
i−1∑
k=1
(
me
k
)k ( 1
m
)k (
1− 1m
)m−k
≥ 1 + i
−i
1 + (i− 1) ·maxk( ek )k
≥ 1 + i
−i
1 + (i− 1)e .
It suffices to show that this last quantity, when multiplied with Pr[G], is at least 1. We consider the com-
plement of event G, call it even B. The event B occurs only when none of the 4i/2 groups split favorably.
The probability that a group splits favorably (for i ≥ 1) is 2 · ( m−im/2−i)
/( m
m/2
) ≥ 2−(i−1). So we can
see that Pr[B] ≤ (1 − 2−(i−1))4i/2 ≤ e−(4/2)i , and thus Pr[G] ≥ 1 − e−(4/2)i . It can be verified that
(1− e−(4/2)i) ·
(
1 + i
−i
1+(i−1)e
)
≥ 1.
Lemma 2.9 For a random variable X whose distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, X
is stochastically dominated by rX[1:r].
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Proof: The hazard rate function is related to the cumulative distribution function as Pr[X ≥ t] = e−
∫ t
0 h(z) dz .
Likewise, we can write:
Pr[rX[1:r] ≥ t] = Pr[X[1:r] ≥ t/r] = (e−
∫ t/r
0
h(z) dz)r = e−r
∫ t/r
0
h(z) dz.
In order to prove the lemma, we need only show that
∫ t
0 h(z) dz ≥ r ·
∫ t/r
0 h(z) dz. Since the hazard rate
function h(z) is monotone, the function
∫ t
0 h(z) dz is a convex function of t. The required inequality follows
from the definition of convexity.
Lemma 2.10 Let K1, · · · ,Kn be independent and identically distributed integer random variables such
that for some constant c > 1, we have Kj ≥ c for all j, and let W1, · · · ,Wn be arbitrary independent
nonnegative variables. Then,
E [maxj Wj[Kj :Kj]] ≤ cc−1 E [K1]E [maxj Wj] .
Proof: We consider the following process for generating correlated samples formaxjWj andmaxjWj [Kj :Kj ].
We first independently instantiate Kj for every j; recall that these are identically distributed variables. Let
k =
∑
jKj ≥ cn. Then we consider all possible n! permutations of these instantiated values. For each
permutation σ, we make the corresponding number of independent draws of the random variable Wj for all
j; call this set of draws Xσ. In all, we get kn! draws from the distributions, that is, | ∪σ Xσ| = kn!. Exactly
k(n− 1)! of these draws belong to any particular j; denote these by Yj .
Now, the maximum element out of each of theXσ sets is an independent draw from the same distribution
maxj Wj[Kj :Kj ] is drawn from. We get n! independent samples from that distribution. Call this set of
samples X.
Next note that each set Yj contains k(n − 1)! independent draws from the distribution corresponding
to Wj . We construct a uniformly random n-dimensional matching over the sets Yj , and from each n-tuple
in this matching we pick the maximum. Each such maximum is an independent draw from the distribution
corresponding to maxj Wj , and we get k(n− 1)! such samples; call this set of samples Y .
Finally, we claim that E[
∑
y∈Y y] ≥ (1 − 1/c)E[
∑
x∈X x], with the expectation taken over the ran-
domness in generating the n-dimensional matching across the Yjs. The lemma follows, since we have
E[
∑
x∈X x] = n!E[maxjWj [Kj :Kj ]] as well as
E[
∑
y∈Y
y] = E
{Kj}
[k(n − 1)!E[max
j
Wj ]] = n!E[Kj ]E[max
j
Wj].
To prove the claim, we call an x ∈ X “good” if the n-tuple in the matching over {Yj} that it belongs to does
not contain any other element of X. Then, E[
∑
y∈Y y] ≥ E[
∑
x∈X xPr[x is “good”]].
Let us compute the probability that some x is “good”. Without loss of generality, suppose that x ∈ Y1.
In order for x to be good, it’s n-tuple must not contain any of the other elements of X from the other Yj’s.
If we define xj = |X ∩ Yj |, then Pr[x is “good”] is at least
∏
j 6=1(1 − xjk(n−1)!) where
∑
xj ≤ n!. This
product is minimized when we set one of the xjs to n! and the rest to 0, and takes on a minimum value of
1− n/k ≥ 1− 1/c.
Lemma 2.11 Let X1, · · · ,Xn be arbitrary correlated real-valued random variables. Let Y1, · · · , Yn be
independent random variables defined so that the distribution of Yi is identical to that of Xi for all i. Then,
E[maxj Xj ] ≤ ee−1 E[maxj Yj].
16
Proof: We use the following result from [1] (also implicit in [5]). Let U be a universe of n elements, f a
monotone increasing submodular function over subsets of this universe, and D a distribution over subsets
of U . Let D˜ be a product distribution (that is, every element is picked independently to draw a set from this
distribution) such that PrS∼D[i ∈ S] = PrS∼D˜[i ∈ S]. Then ES∼D[f(S)] ≤ ee−1 ES∼D˜[f(S)].
To apply this theorem, let us first assume that the variables Xi are discrete random variables over a finite
domain. The universe U will then have one element for each possible instantiation of each variable Xi with
a value equal to that instantiation. Then any joint instantiation of the variables X1, · · · ,Xn corresponds to
a subset of U ; let D denote the corresponding distribution over subsets. Let f be the max function over
the instantiated subset. Then E[maxj Xj ] is exactly equal to ES∼D[f(S)]. As before, let D˜ denote the
distribution over subsets of U where each element is picked independently. Likewise, the random variables
Y1, · · · , Yn define a distribution, say D′, over subsets of U . Note that under D′ the memberships of elements
of U in the instantiated subset are negatively correlated – for two elements that correspond to instantiations
of the same variable, including one in the subset implies that the other is not included. This raises the
expected maximum. In other words, ES∼D′ [f(S)] ≥ ES∼D˜[f(S)]. Therefore, we get E[maxjXj ] =
ES∼D[f(S)] ≤ (e/e − 1)ES∼D′ [f(S)] = (e/e− 1)E[maxj Yj].
When the variables Xj are defined over a continuous but bounded domain, we can apply the above
argument to an arbitrarily fine discretization of the variables. Our claim then follows from taking the limit
as the granularity of the discretization goes to zero.
Finally, let us address the boundedness assumption. For some ǫ < 1/n2, let B be defined so that for
all i, Pr[Xi > B] ≤ ǫ. Then the contribution to the expected maximum from values above B is similar
for the Xs and the Y s: the probability that some variable Xi attains the maximum value b > B is at most
Pr[Xi = b] whereas the probability that the variable Yi attains the maximum value b > B is at least
(1 − ǫ)n−1 Pr[Yi = b]. Therefore, E[maxjXj ] ≤ (1 + o(ǫ))(e/e − 1)E[maxj Yj ]. Taking the limit as ǫ
goes to zero implies the theorem.
Comparing OPT and OPTδ We now prove Lemma 2.1. The key intuition behind the lemma is that it
can be viewed as the result of scaling both sides of the stochastic dominance relation of Lemma 2.9 up
by a constant, and as we shall see, the monotone hazard rate condition is retained by the minimum among
multiple draws from a probability distribution.
Lemma 2.1 When the distributions of job sizes have monotone hazard rates the expected worst best and
average best runtimes on δm machines are no more than 1/δ2 times the expected worst best and average
best runtimes respectively on m machines.
Proof: We will show that the random variable Tj[1:δm] is stochastically dominated by 1δTj [1:m]. Then, the
expected worst best runtime with δm machines is no more than 1/δ times the expected worst best runtime
with m machines. Likewise, the expected average best runtime with δm machines is no more than 1/δ2
times the expected average best runtime with m machines. (The extra 1/δ factor comes about because we
average over δm machines for the former, versus over m machines for for the latter.)
Our desired stochastic dominance relation is precisely of the form given by Lemma 2.9. In particular,
observe that taking a minimum among m draws is exactly the same as first splitting the m draws into 1/δ
groups, selecting the minimum from each group of δm draws, and then taking the minimum from this
collection of 1/δ values. Thus, we can see that (1/δ)Tj [1:m] = (1/δ)Tj [1:δm][1:1/δ], and so the claim
follows immediately from Lemma 2.9 as long as the distribution of Tj [1:δm] has a monotone hazard rate.
We show in Claim 1 below that the first order statistic of i.i.d. monotone hazard rate distributions also has a
monotone hazard rate.
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Claim 1 A distribution F has a monotone hazard rate if and only if the distribution of the minimum among
k draws from F has a monotone hazard rate.
Proof: Let Fk denote the cdf for minimum among n draws from F . Then we have Fk(x) = 1−(1−F (x))k ,
and the corresponding fk(x) = k(1− F (x))k−1f(x). Thus the hazard rate function is:
hk(x) =
fk(x)
1− Fk(x) =
k(1− F (x))k−1f(x)
(1− F (x))k = k
f(x)
1− F (x) .
This is precisely k times the hazard rate function h(x), and therefore, hk(x) is monotone increasing if and
only if h(x) is.
6 Conclusions
Non-linear objectives coupled with multi-dimensional preferences present a significant challenge in mecha-
nism design. Our work shows that this challenge can be overcome for the makespan objective when agents
(machines) are a priori identical. This suggests a number of interesting directions for follow-up. Is the gap
between the first-best and second-best solutions (i.e. the cost of incentive compatibility) still small when
agents are not identical? Does knowledge of the prior help? Note that this question is meaningful even if
we ignore computational efficiency. On the other hand, even if the gap is small, the optimal incentive com-
patible mechanism may be too complex to find or implement. In that case, can we approximate the optimal
incentive compatible mechanism in polynomial time?
Similar questions can be asked for other non-linear objectives. One particularly interesting objective is
max-min fairness, or in the context of scheduling, maximizing the running time of the least loaded machine.
Unlike for makespan, in this case we cannot simply “discard” a machine (that is, schedule no jobs on it)
without hurting the objective. This necessitates techniques different from the ones developed in this paper.
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